Case  CCT 154/24
[2026] ZACC 27

 Judgement Date: 29 June 2026

Post Judgment Media Summary  

The following explanatory note is provided to assist the media in reporting this case and is not binding on the Constitutional Court or any member of the Court.

On 29 June 2026, the Constitutional Court handed down judgment in an application for leave to appeal against part of the judgment and order of the Supreme Court of Appeal concerning the award of interest on damages for unlawful arrest and detention.

The applicant is the Minister of Police. The respondent instituted an action for damages arising from her unlawful arrest and detention after members of the South African Police Service arrested her at King Shaka International Airport in December 2011. She remained in custody for several days before being released on bail. The criminal charges against her were subsequently withdrawn after fingerprint verification confirmed that she was not the person sought by the police.

In December 2013, the respondent instituted an action for damages in the High Court. In addition to awarding general damages, the High Court ordered the Minister to pay interest on the damages from the date of service of summons until the date of payment. In doing so, the High Court relied on section 2A of the Prescribed Rate of Interest Act 55 of 1975, which governs the payment of interest on unliquidated debts.

The Minister sought leave to appeal against both the amount of damages awarded and the order relating to interest. Although leave to appeal was refused by the High Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal ultimately upheld the order that interest should run from the date of service of summons. The Minister then approached the Constitutional Court, contending that the matter raised an arguable point of law of general public importance concerning the proper interpretation and application of the Prescribed Rate of Interest Act.

The principal issue before this Court was whether interest on an award of general damages for unlawful arrest and detention should run from the date of service of summons or only from the date of judgment until payment.

The Minister submitted that the introduction of section 2A of the Act did not displace the continued operation of the statutory provisions governing interest on judgment debts. It argued that damages for unlawful arrest and detention are ordinarily assessed according to their value at the date judgment is delivered. Accordingly, awarding interest from the date of summons while simultaneously assessing damages at current monetary values results in an unjustified increase in the compensation awarded.

The Minister further contended that courts have adopted inconsistent approaches to the commencement of interest on general damages and that section 2A should not be interpreted as requiring interest automatically to run from the date of demand or service of summons in every case involving unliquidated debts. Instead, it argued that section 2A(5), which empowers courts to determine the date from which interest should run, provides the appropriate mechanism to achieve fairness and equity.

In a unanimous judgment written by Mathopo J (with Mlambo DCJ, Dambuza J, Kollapen J, Majiedt J, Mhlantla J, Nuku AJ, Opperman AJ, Rogers J, Savage J, and Tshiqi J concurring) this Court held that section 2A(5) confers a discretion on courts to depart from the general rule that interest on an unliquidated debt runs from the date of demand or service of summons. That discretion must be exercised where fairness requires a different result.

The Court held that the Supreme Court of Appeal failed to consider the discretion afforded by section 2A(5). Nor was there any indication that the respondent's general damages had been assessed according to their value at the date summons was served. Instead, the damages were quantified according to prevailing monetary values at the date of judgment. In those circumstances, ordering interest to run from the date of service of summons substantially increased the compensation awarded and produced an inequitable result.

The Court concluded that there is ordinarily no sound basis for awarding interest before judgment where the amount of general damages could not reasonably have been known or determined before the court assessed them. Where general damages are assessed according to their value at the date of judgment, fairness generally requires that interest should run only from the date of judgment until payment.

Accordingly, the Court held that interest on the respondent's general damages should run from the date of judgment to the date of payment. The application for leave to appeal succeeded, and the appeal was upheld to the extent that the order of the Supreme Court of Appeal was amended to provide that interest on the respondent's damages shall run from the date of judgment until the date of payment.

The Full judgment  here